Outsourcing the State? Public–Private Partnerships and Information Technologies in India

This paper examines public–private partnerships (PPPs) for development through the example of telecenters in two Indian states. How might a developmental state position itself with respect to civil society under a PPP model of service delivery? We find that each state’s political economy is reflected in its PPP strategy, but that in both states the emerging middle classes rather than the poor benefit most from ongoing telecenter projects. Outsourcing development services to private entities need not “privatize” the state but does alter the way in which citizens “see” the state. Service delivery through telecenters becomes a symbol of government efficiency and responsiveness.     

对激励我国企业自主创新的思考——由跨国公司技术溢出引发的思考

随着经济全球化的发展和技术变革的加速,跨国公司技术、知识和管理创新产生的溢出效应对本国企业的影响越来越受到关注。但由于受自身的技术吸纳能力、市场竞争环境、科研政策环境等诸多因素的影响,虽然我国对外国直接投资给予了许多政策上的鼓励,特另4是对于技术含量高的投资给予了大力支持,但总体效果并不是太理想。本文在技术溢出的理论基础上重点分析了强化跨国公司在我国技术溢出的效应,基于此提出了加强我国企业技术自主创新的具体措施。     

Compliance and market exclusion in Brazilian agriculture: Analysis and implications for “soft” governance

“Soft” or “hybrid” governance holds considerable promise in attempts to reconfigure state-market-society relationships toward improved environmental outcomes. “Soft” governance processes in Brazil's globally competitive, high-input/output agriculture sector have major implications for landuse policies. Here we identify and analyze two emergent processes, a compliance regime and bioregion-based market exclusion approach, that stand out amid a background of conflicts between agricultural land uses and environmental regulation. We address the effectiveness of “soft” governance, using a framework that focuses on interactions among state and non-state actors, use of geographic information, relations to global processes, and discourse. These policies may play an important role in bridging the divide between environmental and agricultural interests, but market and state actors, and the uneven effects of globalization, will influence effectiveness. Our framework for analyzing governance processes should complement future work that directly measures environmental outcomes.     

An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation

This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay-for-performance sensitivity and derive several new cross-sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies. In addition, we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures.     

Leadership structure and the value of debt contracts: Evidence from the Canadian market

This paper investigates the impact of a firm's leadership structure on its ability to generate value from loans by examining the market reaction to the disclosure of Canadian bank credit agreements. Two leadership structures are considered in this paper. In the first scenario, the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chair of the Board are held by two different persons (denoted as a Separate CEO-Chair structure); in the second scenario, both positions are held by the same person (denoted as a Combined CEO-Chair structure).We observe a stronger market reaction to the announcement of bank credit agreements when firms have a Separate CEO-Chair structure (relative to a Combined CEO-Chair structure). This stronger market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure suggests that the division of CEO and Chair of the Board responsibilities between two people enhances a firm's ability to generate value from its loans. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the observed market reaction for firms with a Separate CEO-Chair structure is even greater when the size of the board of directors is small. Our results also indicate that bank monitoring activities are more valuable for firms with a Combined CEO-Chair structure and no institutional shareholder.     

跨国公司在华投资独资化对技术溢出效应的影响

纵观1986年以来跨国公司对华直接投资方式的变动趋势,可以清晰地看出,其独资化倾向日益明显.独资化对技术溢出效应将产生加快对我国技术输出、增加在我国R＆D机构的建立与投资、优化前向关联和后向关联、示范和模仿更加显著、加速我国人力资本开发等正面的影响,也将产生直接引进技术减少、引发技术安全与技术依赖、削弱我国企业的竞争力、加剧人才流失等负面的影响.     

建立和完善农村合作金融治理结构防范化解金融风险

建立和完善农村合作金融治理结构,就是建立决策、执行、监督、激励相结合的内控机制.它主要体现为自我约束的一种自律行为,是为完成既定的工作目标和防范风险,对内部各职能部门及其工作人员从事的业务活动进行风险控制、制度管理和相互制约的方法、措施和程序.对于防范和化解金融风险,保护存款人和其他客户的合法权益,促进农村合作金融健康发展有着重要作用.     

If Only We Had Listened to Ross Skinner!*

Ross Skinner built his intimate knowledge of the intricacies of the art of accounting through a very long and rich career as an “accounting philosopher". This allowed him to both observe, and be part of, the formalization of today's GAAP. The duration and timing of Skinner's career also allowed him to experience directly the gradual evolution of our accounting model from an approach based largely on principles to one based increasingly on rules. The objective of this paper is to look behind accounting figures, which are the product of varying combinations of rules and judgment, and to discuss some recent events that have rocked the auditing and accounting profession. Our comments are presented in the context of views expressed by Skinner in his 1995 “Judgment in Jeopardy” article. Skinner had a keen interest in accounting history. Therefore, we begin our paper by referring to Paciol's notion of “venture accounting". We use this notion to introduce our discussion of financial reporting, which has become an important instrument of resource allocation and a challenge for professional judgment. This leads us to describe some of the ideas Skinner presented in his article on accounting judgment as “visionary". Had we listened to him, perhaps we could have avoided some of the costly changes and additions recently imposed on our governance system, such as the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board and the tightening of several laws and regulations.     

试论公司章程对公司对外担保权的影响

公司章程对公司对外担保权有何影响?新《公司法》规定模糊.在世界性的废除法人越权行为原则之际,国内法律界对公司越权对外担保依然讳莫如深.国际经验显示,公司章程对公司对外担保的约束越发体现于程序上的内部规制,对外担保是公司固有的权能已渐成共识.我国法律及时作出修正实乃大势所趋.     

股权制衡与公司业绩：理论与事实

运用中国上市公司2003年度的数据,比较股权制衡的公司与股权集中、股权分散公司经营业绩,得出股权制衡的公司业绩要好于股权分散和股权集的公司,因而股权制衡对上市公司绩效产生正面影响。